The social responsibility of international business (IB) scholars stems first and foremost from the social responsibility of scholars. All scholars seek truth (through research), disseminate learning (through teaching), and make a difference (through service) (Peng and Dess 2010) . What then specifically is the social responsibility of IB scholars? Surprisingly, there is no previous research on IB scholars' social responsibility. 1 Endeavoring to partially fill the gap, we argue that the social responsibility of IB scholars is to seek truth, disseminate learning, and make a difference on issues crucial to the global economy. Instead of making philosophical and abstract arguments on the social responsibility of IB scholars, in this article we focus on a leading debate of our time: How to view the rise of China's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI)?
While the IB literature on the rise of China's OFDI brought by its multinational enterprises (MNEs) is rapidly mushrooming (Alon 2010; Buckley et al., 2007; Morck, Yeung, and Zhao 2008; Peng 2011; Peng, Bhagat, and Chang 2010; Sun, Peng, Ren, and Yan 2011; Wei 2010) , discussion of the rise of China is no longer limited to the IB (or "AIB") community. Rather, there is no shortage of media reports produced by non-scholars. If we can summarize the hundreds of media reports and books on the rise of China in the Western (English-speaking) world, one pervasive theme seems to be a general sense of the "China threat." David Lampton (2010) , a leading China scholar in the United States, has labeled this literature "China on steroids." To the best of our knowledge, no previous IB research has confronted this crucial question: How should we as IB scholars respond to the "China threat" portrayed by the "China on steroids" literature?
We argue that IB scholars have a social responsibility-in addition to our scholarly and professional responsibility-to join this debate and clear the air. As scholars, we have unique capabilities and advantages relative to other groups, such as journalists, policy gurus, and social commentators who are visible in articulating the "China threat" view. We are more empirical, we have a deeper respect for 1 Disappointingly, the website of IB's leading professional association, the Academy of International Business (AIB), has no information on this topic. All our searches on the AIB website on "social responsibility" and "social responsibility of IB scholars" resulted in entries on corporate social responsibility (search on January 24, 2011).
data and facts, and we are less ideological. In this article, we will focus on the core areas of IB scholarship, FDI and MNEs, 2 and we will let better minds in other disciplines such as international political economy to deal with the political, military, and social implications of the rise of China. Our central argument is that the so-called "China threat" brought by Chinese MNEs' OFDI is a myth that cannot be substantiated by evidence-based scholarly analysis.
THE "CHINA ON STEROIDS" LITERAURE
If one believes what is printed by the media, it is hard not to believe that emerging multinationals from China are such a dominant force "intent on buying the world" (BusinessWeek 2009: 36) . The following are some recent cover stories:
• Economist (May 19, 2007) : "America's fear of China"
• BusinessWeek (July 27, 2009): "China goes shopping"
• Fortune (October 26, 2009): "China buys the World"
• Economist (November 11, 2010) : "Buying up the world"
A number of popular books such as When China Rules the World (Jacques 2009 ) have played up the "China on steroids" theme and sold thousands of copies. Overall, three impressions emerge: (1) China is a dominant player in OFDI in the world, (2) China is the number one OFDI player among emerging economies, and (3) Chinese OFDI has significant global reach. As IB scholars, we need to ask: Really?
WHAT DO THE DATA SUGGEST?
The data suggest that all three impressions are unsubstantiated. First, in terms of China's alleged "global dominance" in OFDI, Figure 1 shows that in 2009 (the most recent year on which data are available), 2 In other words, we focus on the "D word" (direct) in FDI, and do not cover the nature and implications of nondirect investment from China (mostly purchases of foreign government bonds such as U.S. Treasury bills). Such non-direct investment is typically labeled foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in IB textbooks (Peng 2011 ).
China was not even among the top five OFDI generating economies. While the United States, France, Germany, and Japan generated more OFDI than China, we have not found any media report alleging that MNEs from these economies are "buying up the world."
[Insert Figure 1 Now, how can MNEs from a country that has just over 1% of the global OFDI stock be in a position to "buy up the world" (even if they wanted to)? Clearly, any PhD candidate making such a bold conclusion based on this kind of data would have had his/her dissertation rejected and his/her candidacy disqualified.
A second impression one easily gets from the media is that China must be the largest OFDI originating country among emerging economies such as the bloc known as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC). Again, this is not the case (Kalotay and Sulstrarova 2010) . The World Investment Report published by UNCTAD (2010: 172-175) shows that while China's OFDI stock (1.21% of global OFDI stock) is indeed more than that of both India (0.41%) and Brazil (0.83%), Russia's (1.31%) OFDI stock is greater than China's. Yet, there is hardly any literature on "Russia on steroids" trying to "take over the world" (at least not since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991). And there is certainly not much coverage about the "Brazil threat" brought by its OFDI. MNEs are not very global, but rather are very regional-centered on Asia (Rugman, 2005) .
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Further digging reveals two interesting insights. First, although (mainland) Chinese, Hong Kong,
and international authorities such as UNCTAD (2010) record investment between China and Hong Kong as "cross-border" and "international" (Fung, Yau, and Zhang 2011) , such deals evidently are not very "foreign"-the F in FDI. While one can hardly make a case that China's OFDI has taken over the world, a case can be made that it has taken over Hong Kong (absorbing 2/3 of total Chinese OFDI stock).
Second, after taking out Hong Kong's share, the rest of the world only receives approximately 0.40% of the global OFDI stock from China (that is: 1.21% of total global OFDI stock × 33.06% of Chinese OFDI that does not go to Hong Kong). Take, for example, North America, which has received 2.11% of total Chinese OFDI. Simple math shows that total Chinese OFDI in North America represents a tiny sum of 0.026% of global FDI stock (that is: 1.21% of global total × 2.11%). Rather than "threatening," Chinese OFDI is clearly "negligible" in North America (Scissors 2010: 8) .
Overall, none of the three widely held impressions can withstand scrutiny from an empirical, evidence-based standpoint. China's OFDI stock (1.21% of global total or 0.40% if "FDI" to Hong Kong is excluded) hardly warrants the kind of disproportionate (Western) media attention and hoopla that it has received. A lot of the conclusions and opinions on the "China threat" as represented by OFDI from Chinese MNEs are therefore unsubstantiated, overblown, and often "absurd" (Scissors 2010: 7) .
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WHAT IS (RELATIVELY) UNIQUE ABOUT CHINESE OFDI?
If quantitatively, Chinese OFDI does not deserve the disproportionate attention and sensation it commands in the Western media, then are there any unique, qualitative attributes associated with it?
While significant components of the strategy and behavior of Chinese MNEs are consistent with what we observe of MNEs from other countries, we agree that new research by scholars and new reports by the media need to focus on the unique aspects of such emerging multinationals (Peng 2012) . Based on our own research, we identify two unique aspects associated with Chinese OFDI. But, we contend that these aspects still do not justify the disproportionate attention that Chinese MNEs and OFDI have received.
First, the scale and scope of capital round-tripping, under the cloak of OFDI, are substantial. A careful look at the top ten recipient economies of China's OFDI stock and top ten investing economies in China's inward FDI (IFDI) stock shows that Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, and the BVI occupy the top eight positions (see Table 1 ). To put things in perspective, Chinese MNEs invest more in the Cayman
Islands and the BVI than they invest in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany combined.
In turn, together the Cayman Islands and the BVI invest more in China than the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany combined. The only reason to explain these puzzling FDI patterns is capital round-tripping (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2006) . 6 In other words, some Chinese MNEs invest in these "tax 5 While outside the scope of our focus on FDI, we acknowledge that the fact that China is now the largest holder of US Treasury securities (holding $896 billion as of the end of 2010) may also feed into the media hoopla on China's investment in the United States. However, to put things in perspective, it is important to note that during 2010, China decreased its holdings by 4%, while Japan increased its holdings of Treasury securities by 10% (to $877 billion), making it the second largest holder-note a mere $19 billion difference between Chinese and Japanese holdings. The United Kingdom more than tripled its holdings to $511 billion, making it the third largest holder.
Despite such large increases, we have not heard much of the "Japan threat" or the "UK threat" in the United States.
havens" to transform themselves into "foreign-domiciled" companies, which then can invest in China as foreign investors to take advantage of tax and other concessions back home. Hong Kong has long served such a role (Fung et al. 2011 If Chinese OFDI is a threat to anybody, it (at least some of it) is a threat to China. Specifically, the "threat to China" has two dimensions. The first "threat" is to China's domestic tax base because a lot of Chinese firms, in search of lower tax rates, have become foreign-domiciled companies via OFDI and then IFDI (round-tripping) (Fung et al. 2011; Huang 2003) . Until 2008, China's tax laws discriminated against domestic firms. Domest Chinese firms were assessed a 33% corporate income tax rate, while foreign firms, funded partially or wholly by IFDI, were only required to pay about half of that amount (15% or 24% depending on the industry). Executives at Chinese firms are simply being rational by engaging in such capital round-tripping to take advantage of the lower tax rates as "foreign" firms (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, and Chen 2009 Rugman's (1981 Rugman's ( , 2005 concept of country-specific advantage (CSA), we define Chinese synergy as the unique ability to link China-based resources (such as market size and 9 Of course, capital round-tripping is not a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. After all, the Cayman Islands and the BVI earned their reputation as "tax havens" before Chinese MNEs emerged. A fair question is if the Chinese government is creating distortion that leads to capital flight to the Cayman Islands and the BVI, how is it different from the loopholes in the US tax law that lead to so many special purpose entities by American multinationals? The answer boils down to the magnitude of degree (Peng 2012) . It is true that such US OFDI in tax havens may become a threat to US tax base. But despite the numerous US special purpose entities in the Cayman Islands and the BVI presumably for tax haven purposes, these countries appear neither among the top five recipient countries of US OFDI, nor among the top five countries making IFDI in the United States. These countries are routinely among the top ten for both OFDI stock from China and IFDI stock in China (see Table 1 ). Another recent case is Citic Capital Partner's $65.6 million investment in Tri-Wall, a heavy-duty packaging firm headquartered in Tokyo. Foreign companies usually face resistance in Japan, and large US and European private-equity firms have often struggled to complete deals there. Tri-Wall specializes in triple-layered corrugate packaging, and knows the importance of the China market, which comprises over 40% of its sales. The deal will help it grow in China, a burgeoning economy, especially when compared with the stagnant Japanese economy. Citic Capital Partners has made significant investments in several Japanese companies, such as coated-film maker Higashiyama Film, tableware-products maker Narumi China, and food and beverages maker Pokka, with the aim of helping them expand in China. Given the traditional Japanese discrimination against Chinese firms and the documented resistance against inbound foreign M&As in general, a crucial factor in the success of the deals put together by Citic Capital Partners is that Japanese target firms are convinced of the "China synergy."
Of course, the uniqueness associated with Chinese OFDI is relative, and is not absolute (Peng 2012) . But do these two aspects justify the disproportionate media attention on such OFDI resulting in the "China on steroids" literature? Hardly! If anything, these two aspects undermine the argument that China's OFDI is a "threat" to the rest of the world, because they suggest that Chinese OFDI is more domestically oriented and has focused more on how to effectively compete back home in China.
THREE HYPOTHESES ON THE MYTH
It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the "China threat" has now become a myth in the Western world.
Although typically disconnected from realities and unsubstantiated by facts, myths have a tendency to take on a life of their own. 11 As scholars, we need to ask why the "China threat" myth has risen in the first place. We suggest three hypotheses. A second hypothesis is that certain branches of the US government and their stakeholders-in particular, the military and defense industry-may have vested interests in fueling the myth on the "China threat" in order to protect their budgets and jobs. During an age of skyrocketing government deficits and shrinking defense budgets, emphasizing a "threat" from a rival makes sense.
While these two hypotheses are both interesting and plausible, as noted earlier, we believe they may be more appropriately investigated by experts in disciplines such as international political economy than by IB scholars. Therefore, we refrain from commenting on these two hypotheses further. Drawing on 11 Confronting this myth, the Chinese media, policymakers, and average citizens often complain there is a Western "conspiracy" against China. Not surprisingly, the Chinese media has often featured pieces about the "threat of a hostile West," with provocative titles such as "China is unhappy" and "China can say no." Discussion of how IB scholars should react to the perception (and perhaps also the myth) of the "threat of the West" in China is outside the scope of this article, but remains a fascinating topic for future research.
our expertise and experience in business schools (and the business world), we argue that the third hypothesis also makes sense. The third hypothesis is an industry-specific hypothesis concerning the nature of the media industry. It suggests that the media industry, due to its competitive nature, has an inherent bias to exaggerate new phenomenon and to ignore non-supportive evidence. We are aware that our third hypothesis goes against the "objective" reporting of truth that the media industry would like to have us believe. All of us are avid consumers of the media. As scholars, we appreciate the contributions made by our colleagues working in the media industry and some of them, such as Thomas Friedman's The World is Flat (2005) , have made tremendous contributions to the IB field by popularizing the notion of globalization. Therefore, we are not here to castigate the media industry and its hard working contributors. We do not imply that a media "conspiracy" exists. Rather, we believe there is a media tendency to exaggerate-essentially an informal norm (Peng et al., 2009) . As scholars, here we endeavor to put forward three hypotheses to explain the likely causes behind the myth associated with biased reporting on the scale and scope of Chinese OFDI that is not substantiated by data.
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12 OFDI is not the only area where China-related reporting has been biased. IB scholar Hari Bapuji (2011) documents the case that in toy recalls, China has also unnecessarily and disproportionately received biased, negative reporting. In the most exhaustively researched book on toy recalls simply titled Not Just China, Bapuji
EMBRACING THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF IB SCHOLARS
As society's "brain trust," scholars have the sacred social responsibility to seek truth, disseminate learning, and make a difference. Accordingly, IB scholars cannot shy away from the leading debates of our time, such as how to appropriately view the rise of China as a global economic power. To embrace our inescapable social responsibility, we suggest that IB scholars intensify our engagements in three areas.
First, seek truth by undertaking more insightful research. Decades of research on FDI and MNE has focused on MNEs' technological, financial, and managerial capabilities, and has underappreciated the role of institutions-both at home and abroad. Rugman's (1981 Rugman's ( , 2005 ) work on CSA is an example of paying more attention the specific institutions associated with various country environments. Such thinking has recently been broadened to become a part of the institution-based view (Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan 2010; Dunning and Lundan 2008; Peng, Wang, and Jiang 2008) . While the proposition that "institutions matter" is hardly novel or controversial, we have yet to unlock the institutional "black box" behind the rise of China's OFDI. Specifically, we need more research on how the domestic institutions in China, especially unequal tax and other treatments between domestic and foreign firms, give rise to China's OFDI. Existing theories on FDI and MNE either ignore capital round-tripping or have a hard time explaining it. 13 From an institution-based view (Peng et al. , 2009 , firms that undertake capital round-tripping essentially engage in institutional (or regulatory) arbitrage (Fung et al. 2011) . Clearly more solid research, along the lines of Desai et al. (2006) and Fung et al. (2011) , is needed.
Second, as educators, we need to teach our students not to believe every word that is printed by today's media. Enhancing critical thinking skills is not only a time-honored (but largely informal) (2011: 145) concludes that "the increases in product recalls may not have been caused by China" and that most toy recalls are caused by design flaws made in the headquarters country of the toy companies.
tradition for all educators, but is now an explicit formal mandate for business school professors (per AACSB accreditation standards). Despite their timeliness and provocativeness, media reports obviously are not textbooks. For any students deeply believing in the thrust of the "China on steroids" literature, we can point out: What happened to the "Japan on steroids" literature a generation ago? Is there any "Japan threat" anymore?
Finally, IB scholars need to seek to influence the views of the media, practitioners, and policymakers by fostering dialogues, disseminating new evidence, and helping craft sensible and balanced media reports, industry practices, and public policies. In our view, the ultimate social responsibility of IB scholars is to promote world peace by enhancing the trade and investment links among countries in the world. materials (such as oil, steel, and scrap metal) crucial to the Japanese military at that time. Out of our social responsibility, IB scholars need to draw on these historical experiences to make our case for the necessity of strengthening the trade and investment links among countries for the sake of world peace, in addition to the traditional goals such as economic development and corporate profits.
While China "has the same right to engage in international commercial activity as any country" (Scissors 2010 : 10), China's OFDI, like all OFDI, will not be perfect. In other words, China's OFDI will certainly bring both benefits and costs to host economies. We argue that policymakers in host economies embrace pragmatic nationalism as opposed to being exclusively influenced by the "China on steroids" literature, which is not substantiated by data analyzed earlier in this article. Pragmatic nationalism refers to "considering both the pros and cons of FDI and approving FDI only when its benefits outweigh its costs" (Peng 2011: 193) . If China's OFDI in certain cases are deemed potentially undermining the national security of host economies, a case can certainly be made to disapprove such deals. But an indiscriminant, one-sided, negative approach, influenced by the "China on steroids" literature, is not
warranted. An exhaustive review of the pros and cons of Chinese FDI in the United States by two IB scholars-an American and a Canadian-note:
It seems feckless on the part of US policymakers to stigmatize Chinese investment in the United States based upon imprecise and likely exaggerated estimates of the relevant costs and risks of that investment (Globerman and Shapiro 2009: 180 More managerial jobs for locals. These jobs are not necessarily limited to those in the Chinese subsidiaries, and may also include consulting, financing, legal, and training jobs outside these firms.
Overall, we are not suggesting that China's OFDI brought by its emerging MNEs does not deserve IB scholars' attention. It certainly does. We have personally engaged in a series of research on this topic (Peng 2011 (Peng , 2012 ). What we are suggesting is that China's OFDI does not deserve the disproportionate media attention, which has resulted in some unbalanced and unhealthy perception that cannot be substantiated by data. In other words, a socially sensible approach is not to view Chinese MNEs as scary, fire-breathing "dragons" on the verge of taking over the world-they are far from being capable of doing that. To be sure, host country governments, firms, and the public need to be serious in dealing with this previously unknown breed of organizations on the global scene. Therefore, a useful metaphor is to view these emerging multinationals as fast, strong "horses" unleashed by the forces of globalization in the 21 st century (Peng 2012) .
CONCLUSION
Although management (including IB) scholarship has often been criticized for its alleged lack of relevance to practitioners and policymakers, we disagree. The truth is that few management and IB scholars care nothing for practice (Peng and Dess 2010: 292) . On issues of grave importance not only to the IB field but also to the wider world, such as the rise of China's OFDI, IB scholars have the sacred social responsibility to shed light, clear the air, and steer the course of public perceptions, by drawing on our time-honored, evidence-based scholarly tradition. While this article has focused on the debate on China's OFDI, we are confident that IB scholars can make a difference in many other areas as well. If we fail to do that, we believe we will be failing both our students who are being trained as future IB 
